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Abstract
Perception is a critical component of high-integrity applications of robotics and au-
tonomous systems, such as self-driving cars. In these applications, failure of perception
systems may put human life at risk, and a broad adoption of these technologies re-
lies on the development of methodologies to guarantee and monitor safe operation as
well as detect and mitigate failures. Despite the paramount importance of perception
systems, currently there is no formal approach for system-level monitoring. In this
work, we propose a mathematical model for runtime monitoring and fault detection of
perception systems. Towards this goal, we draw connections with the literature on self-
diagnosability for multiprocessor systems, and generalize it to (i) account for modules
with heterogeneous outputs, and (ii) add a temporal dimension to the problem, which
is crucial to model realistic perception systems where modules interact over time. This
contribution results in a graph-theoretic approach that, given a perception system, is
able to detect faults at runtime and allows computing an upper-bound on the number
of faulty modules that can be detected. Our second contribution is to show that the
proposed monitoring approach can be elegantly described with the language of topos
theory, which allows formulating diagnosability over arbitrary time intervals.
1 Introduction
The automotive industry is undergoing a change that could revolutionize mobility. Self-
driving cars promise a deep transformation of personal mobility and have the potential to
improve safety, efficiency (e.g., commute time, fuel), and induce a paradigm shift in how
entire cities are designed [1]. One key factor that drives the adoption of such technology
is the capability of ensuring and monitoring safe execution. Consider Uber’s fatal self-
driving crash [2] in 2018: the report from the National Transportation Safety Board stated
that “inadequate safety culture” contributed to the fatal collision between the autonomous
vehicle and the pedestrian. The lack of safety guarantees, combined with the unavailability
of formal monitoring tools, is the root cause of these accidents and has a profound impact
on the user’s trust. The AAA’s survey [3] shows that 71% of Americans claim to be afraid of
riding in a self-driving car. This is a clear sign that the industry needs a sound methodology,
embedded in the design process, to guarantee safety and build public trust.
While safety guarantees have been investigated in the context of control and decision-
making [4], [5], the state of the art is still lacking a formal and broadly applicable methodol-
ogy for monitoring perception systems, which constitute a key component of any autonomous
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vehicle. Perception systems provide functionalities such as localization and obstacle map-
ping, lane detection, detection and tracking of other vehicles and pedestrians, among others.
State of Practice. The automotive industry currently uses five classes of methods to claim
the safety of an autonomous vehicle (AV) [6], namely: miles driven, simulation, scenario-
based testing, disengagement, and proprietary. The miles driven approach is the most
commonly used, and is based on the statistical argument that if the probability of crashes
per mile is lower in autonomous vehicles than for humans, then autonomous vehicles are
safer. This approach is problematic since the meaningful1 number of fault-free miles that the
AV should drive is significant—on the order of billions of miles [6], [7]—which would require
years to achieve and would not enable frequent software updates. The same approach can
be made more scalable through simulation, but unfortunately creating a life-like simulator is
an open problem, for some aspects even more challenging than self-driving itself. Scenario-
based testing is based on the idea that if we can enumerate all the possible driving scenarios
that could occur, then we can simply expose the AV (via simulation, closed-track testing, or
on-road testing) to all of those scenarios and, as a result, be confident that the AV will only
make safe driving decisions. However, enumerating all possible corner cases is a daunting
(and system-dependent) task. Finally, disengagement [8] is defined as the moment when a
human safety driver has to intervene in order to prevent a hazardous situation. However,
while less frequent disengagements indicate an improvement of the AV behavior, they do
not give evidence of the system safety.
An established methodology to ensure safety throughout the life cycle of an automotive
system is to use a standard that every manufacturer has to comply with. In the automotive
industry, the standard ISO 26262 (Road vehicles - functional safety) [9] is a risk-based safety
standard that applies to electronic systems in production vehicles, including driver assistance
and vehicle dynamics control systems. A key issue is that ISO 26262 relies on the presence
of human drivers (and mostly focuses on electronic systems rather than algorithmic aspects)
hence it does not readily apply to fully autonomous vehicles [10]. The recent ISO 21448
(Road vehicles - Safety of the intended functionality) [11] is intended to complement ISO
26262. It provides guidance on the applicable design, verification, and validation measures
needed to achieve the safety at higher levels of automation. The standard has been first
publicly released in 2019, and—while stressing the key role of perception—it only provides
high-level considerations to inform stakeholders. In June 2019, 11 major stakeholder in the
automated driving industry including Aptiv, Baidu, BMW, Intel, and Volkswagen published
a report [12] on safety in autonomous driving. The report focuses on highly autonomous
vehicles, presenting an overview of safety by design and providing a sound discussion of the
verification and validation of such systems. The report proposes a verification and validation
approach mainly based on testing, and suggests the use of monitors to detect off-nominal
performance at the system and subsystem level (including neural networks).
Perception has been subject to increasing attention also outside the automated driving
industry. For instance, autonomous aerial vehicles are expected to disrupt air mobility in
the same way autonomous cars are disrupting urban mobility [13], [14]. A recent report from
the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) [15] acknowledges both the importance
of such technologies and the lack of standardized methods to guarantee trustworthiness of
such systems. The report [15] considers an automatic landing system as case study and
investigates the challenges in developing trustworthy AI, with focus on machine learning.
These reports and standards stress the important role of perception for autonomous systems
and motivate us to design a rigorous framework for system-level perception monitoring.
1Driving on empty streets provides less evidence of safety than driving in dense urban environments.
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Related Work. Formal methods [16] have been recently used as a tool to study safety
of autonomous systems. Formal methods use mathematical models to analyze and verify
part of a program. The insight here is that these mathematical models can be used to
rigorously prove properties of the modeled program. This approach has been successful
for decision systems, such as obstacle avoidance [4] and road rule compliance [17]. This is
mainly due to the fact that decisional specifications are usually model-based and have well-
defined semantics [5]. The challenge in applying this approach to perception is related to the
complexity of modeling the physical environment [18], and the trade-off between evidence
for certification and tractability of the model [19].
Relevant to the approach presented is this paper is the class of runtime verification methods.
Runtime verification is an online approach based on extracting information from a running
system and using it to detect (and possibly react to) observed behaviors satisfying or violat-
ing certain properties [20]. Traditionally, the task of evaluating whether a module is working
properly was assigned to a monitor, which verifies some input/output properties on the mod-
ule alone. Balakrishnan et al. [21] use Timed Quality Temporal Logic (TQTL) to reason
about desiderable spatio-temporal properties of a perception algorithm. Kang et al. [22] use
model assertions, which similarly place a logical constraint on the output of a module to
detect anomalies. We argue that this paradigm does not fully capture the complexity of
perception pipelines: while monitors can still be used to infer the state of a single module,
perception pipelines provide an additional opportunity to cross check the compatibility of
results across different modules. In this paper we try to address this limitation.
Performance guarantees for perception have been investigated for specific problems. In par-
ticular, related work on certifiable algorithms [23]–[25] provides algorithms that are capable
of identifying faulty behaviors during execution. These related works mostly focus on spe-
cific algorithms, while our goal is to establish monitoring for perception systems, including
multiple interacting modules and algorithms.
Contribution. In this paper we develop a methodology to detect and identify faulty mod-
ules in a perception pipeline at runtime. In particular, we address two questions (adapted
from [26]): (i) Can I (as a developer) verify that the perception algorithm is providing reli-
able interpretations of the perception data? (ii) Can I (as regulator) trace the steps that led
to an accident caused by an autonomous vehicle? Towards this goal, we draw connections
with the literature on self-diagnosability for multiprocessor systems, and generalize it to (i)
account for modules with heterogeneous outputs, and (ii) add a temporal dimension to the
problem to account for modules interacting over time. This contribution results in a graph-
theoretic approach that, given a perception system, is able to detect faults at runtime and
allows computing an upper-bound on the number of faulty modules that can be detected.
This upper bound is related to the level of redundancy within the system and provides a
quantitative measure of robustness. Our second contribution is to show that the proposed
monitoring approach can be elegantly described with the language of topos theory [27], [28]
and allows formulating diagnosability and faults detection over arbitrary time intervals.
2 An Example of Perception Pipeline
Consider the system depicted in Fig. 1: this is an example of perception system used to
localize an autonomous vehicle (AV) using multiple sensor streams. We are going to use this
system as a running example throughout the paper to elucidate our mathematical model.
In Fig. 1, the AV observes the world through noisy sensors, each of which provides infor-
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Figure 1: Example of localization system for Autonomous Vehicles.
mation to various perception modules. These perception modules collect, organize, and
interpret sensory information in order to create a model of the world. In this paper, for the
sake of simplicity, we consider a world model that includes only the absolute pose—position
and heading—of the AV, an element of the 3-dimensional Special Euclidean group SE(3).
In Fig. 1, each rectangle inside the “Perception” box represents a perception module, while
each arrow represents a data stream. Let V denote a set of variables; in our example,
V = {vgps, vmap, vlidar, vimu, vcamera, vabs, vodom}. We can tag each arrow with the variable it
carries. Moreover, each variable has its own type. Let Type : V → Set be a map; we say that
Type(v) is the type of variable v. For example, Type(vimu) = R6, a real vector of 6 elements
listing the acceleration and angular velocities measured by the Inertial Measurement Unit
(IMU). At any instant of time, the system takes the measurements from the sensors and
estimates the AV’s absolute pose, denoted by vabs. Let us analyze the modules in Fig. 1:
• The Global Positioning System (GPS) provides raw latitude and longitude data to the
GPS reader, which packages this information and sends it to GPS Data Processing,
which in turn estimates the car’s absolute pose (variable vabs).
• The Light Detection and Ranging (LIDAR) sensor uses light in the form of a pulsed
laser to measure reflection distances, producing a 3D point cloud of the surrounding
environment; the LIDAR reader gets the point cloud while the LIDAR Registration
module estimates the relative motion between consecutive time instants by comparing
consecutive scans [23], The estimate of the relative motion of the AV is commonly
referred to as “odometry” in robotics [29] (variable vodom).
• The High Definition Map Localization uses a given high definition map of the environ-
ment to estimate the absolute position (variable vabs) of the vehicle by comparing the
LIDAR scan with the map.
• The Cameras provide images of the environment, the Camera reader collects raw
images, while the Visual Odometry module estimates the relative motion of the vehicle
by comparing two consecutive images (variable vodom).
• The Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU) measures accelerations and angular velocities
of the car, then by integrating these values over time, IMU integration estimates the
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relative motion of the vehicle (variable vodom).
• Finally, the Pose-Graph Optimization [29] module estimates the vehicle’s pose by fus-
ing the noisy absolute and relative pose measurements produced by the other modules.
Errors are common throughout this pipeline, so it is crucial for the system to self-diagnose
these errors in real time, discard outliers, and produce reliable estimates of the car’s pose
(which can be then used for planning and control purposes). For instance, when operating
near tall buildings, the GPS can provide unreliable measurements. Similarly, when used
in crowded scenes, visual odometry can provide incorrect motion estimates. In the next
sections we study how faults can be diagnosed, using this perception system as an example.
3 Monitoring of Perception Systems
Our first contribution is to develop a mathematical model for monitoring and fault diagnosis
in perception systems. Towards this goal, we draw connections with the literature on fault
diagnosis in multiprocessors systems, which has been extensively studied since the late 1960s.
Section 3.1 reviews the notion of diagnosability and existing results for fault detection and to
characterize diagnosable systems using the PMC (Preparata, Metze, and Chien) model [30].
Section 3.2 extends the notion of diagnosability to perception systems and discusses how to
model temporal aspects arising in real AV applications.
3.1 Diagnosability
In the PMC [30] model, a set of independent processors is assembled such that each pro-
cessor has the capability to communicate with a subset of the other processors, and all of
the processors perform the same computation. In such system a fault occurs whenever the
outputs of a processor differs from the outputs of fault-free processors; the problem is to
identify which is which. Each processor is assigned a particular subset of the other proces-
sors for the purpose of testing. Using a comparison-based mechanism, the model aims to
characterize the set of faulty processors. Clearly, it is not possible to determine the faulty
subset in general, so much of the literature on multiprocessor diagnosis considers two fun-
damental questions [31]: (i) Given a collection of processors and a set of tests, what is the
maximum number of arbitrary processors which can be faulty such that the set of faulty
processors can be uniquely identified? (ii) Given a set of test results, does there exist an
efficient procedure to identify the faulty processors? The key tool to address these questions
is the diagnostic graph [30].
Diagnostic Graph. At any given time, each processor is assumed to be in one of two states:
faulty or fault-free. Diagnosis is based on the ability of processors to test—i.e., to provide an
opinion about the faultiness of—other processors. Formally we assume that each processor
implements one or more consistency functions; these are Boolean functions that return pass
(0) or fail (1), depending on whether the output of two processors is in agreement.
To perform the diagnosis, we follow [30] and model the problem as a directed graph D =
(U,E), where U is the set of processors, while the edges E represent the test assignments.
In particular, for an edge (i, j) ∈ E, we say that node i is testing node j. The outcome
of this test is the result of the consistency functions of i, in other words 1 (resp. 0) if i
evaluates j as faulty (resp. fault-free). Fault-free processors are assumed to provide correct
test results, whereas no assumption is made about tests executed by faulty processors: they
may produce correct or incorrect test outcomes. We call D the diagnostic graph.
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The collection of all test results for a test assignment E is called a syndrome. Formally, a
syndrome is a function σ : E → {0, 1}. The syndrome is processed by an external entity
which diagnoses the system, that is, makes some determination about the faultiness status of
every processor in the system. The notion of t-diagnosability formalizes when it is possible
to use the syndrome to diagnose and identify faults in a system.
Definition 1 (t-diagnosability [30]). A diagnostic graph D = (U,E) with |U |= n processors
is t-diagnosable (t < n) if, given any syndrome, all faulty processors can be identified,
provided that the number of faults presented does not exceed t.
What makes fault detection challenging is the fact that we can have multiple processors
that provide incorrect results but are consistent with each other. This is formalized by the
notion of consistent fault set.
Definition 2 (Consistent fault set [30]). For a syndrome σ, denote the test outcome assigned
to the edge (i, j) by σij ∈ {0, 1}. For a t-diagnosable graph D = (U,E) and a syndrome σ,
a subset F ⊆ U is a t-consistent fault set if and only if
(i) |F |≤ t;
(ii) if σij = 1 then either i ∈ F or j ∈ F
(iii) if i, j ∈ U \ F then σij = 0.
Item (ii) in Definition 2 says that if σij = 1 (i disagrees with j) then at least one between
i and j must be outside the consistent fault set. Item (iii) states that processors outside
the faulty set are in agreement with each other; note that the condition is not if and only if
because we are assuming that tests performed by faulty nodes are unreliable (see example
in Fig. 2), therefore we can have σij = 0 when i is faulty and returns a wrong test result.
Example. Consider the simple example in Fig. 2 (adapted from [30]). For the graph in
Fig. 2, a syndrome will be represented as a list of five elements, (σ12, σ23, σ34, σ45, σ51).
Assume exactly one of the processors, say 1 (w.l.o.g), is faulty. Then σ23 = σ34 = σ45 = 0
and σ51 = 1, i.e., 5 correctly identifies 1 as faulty and σ12 could be either 0 or 1: being
a faulty node, 1 may or may not correctly diagnose 2 ; in the figure we label that edge by
x. In this simple case it is easy to check that, assuming there is only one faulty processor, we
can correctly identify that the faulty processor is 1 . It is natural to ask: can we identify
a faulty condition with two faulty processors? In this graph, we cannot: to prove that, it is
sufficient to show that two different faulty conditions generate the same syndrome (Fig. 2c).
(a) Diagnostic graph (b) Single fault (c) Double fault
Figure 2: (a) Example of diagnostic graph with five processors and (b)-(c) two faulty con-
ditions (faulty processors shown in red) exhibiting the same syndrome.
The problem of determining the maximum value of t for which a given system is t-diagnosable
is called the diagnosability problem. We denote the maximum value of t-diagnosability of a
graph D by t(D).
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3.1.1 Characterization of t-diagnosability
Consider a directed graph D = (U,E). For i ∈ U , we denote by δin(i) the number of edges
directed toward i (in-degree). We denote by δin(D) = mini∈U din(i) the minimum in-degree
of the graph. Moreover, we denote Γ(i) = {j ∈ U | (i, j) ∈ E} the testable set of i (outgoing
neighbors of i). Finally, for X ⊂ U , denote Γ(X) = {⋃i∈X Γ(i) \X}.
We can now state the following fundamental theorem.
Theorem 3 (Characterization of t-diagnosability [32]). Let D = (U,E) be a diagnostic
graph with |U |= n processors. Then D is t-diagnosable if and only if
(i) n ≥ 2t+ 1;
(ii) δin(D) ≥ t; and
(iii) for each integer p with 0 ≤ p < t, and each X ⊂ U with |X|= n − 2t + p we have
|Γ(X)|> p.
Using Theorem 3 we can quickly find that the maximum t in the graph in Fig. 2 is t = 1
because t ≤ bn−12 c = 2 and t ≤ δin(D) = 1. Moreover, condition (iii) holds (t = 1 forces
p = 0 and each X ⊆ U with |X|= 3 has |Γ(X)|> 0).
A naive implementation of Theorem 3 would lead to an algorithm of time complexity
O(nt+2) [33]. Bhat [33] propose an improved algorithm to find the maximum t of an arbi-
trary graph in O(nu+2 log2(u)) where u = min{δin(D), b(n − 1)/2c}. Since this approach
can be impractical for large graphs, they also propose a polynomial algorithm to find a
suboptimal value of t in O(|U |3/2+|E|).
3.1.2 Fault Detection
Once we have a syndrome on a t-diagnosable graph, we would like to actually identify the set
of faulty processors, provided that the number of faults does not exceed t. Dahbura et al. [31]
showed that the problem of identifying the set of faulty processors is related to the problem
of finding the minimum vertex cover set of an undirected graph (i.e. the smallest set C of
vertices such that every edge has an endpoint in C). In general, the problem of finding
a minimum vertex cover is in the class of NP-complete problems, meaning that there is
no known deterministic algorithm that is guaranteed to solve the problem in polynomial
time, but the validity of any solution can be tested in polynomial time. However, the
work [31] exploits some special properties of t-diagnosable graphs to propose an algorithm
with time complexity O(n2.5) for fault identification. In a later work, Sullivan [34] proposes
an algorithm with time complexity O(t3+ |E|) for fault identification and proved that this is
the tightest bound if t is o(n5/6). These results ensure us that fault identification is practical
in real-time and scales well with bigger diagnostic graphs.
3.2 Diagnosability for Perception
In this section we generalize the approach of Section 3.1 to make it applicable to perception
systems. In particular, while in Section 3.1 multiple processors perform the same computa-
tion and yield the same type of output, perception systems are characterized by the fact that
each module produces different variables and potentially at different rates (Fig. 1). There-
fore, in order to build on the diagnosability framework described in the previous section, we
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Figure 3: Example of diagnostic graph D = (U,E) for the localization pipeline in Fig. 1.
have to (i) define consistency functions for a perception system with arbitrary modules, and
(ii) capture temporal aspects that are missing in the original PMC model [30]
3.2.1 Perception Consistency Functions
Consistency functions are used to implement pairwise tests for each edge in a diagnostic
graph. Due to the heterogeneity of the modules of a perception system, we can have different
types of consistency functions, which we describe in the rest of this section. Using these
consistency functions, we can build a diagnostic graph: for instance, in Fig. 3 we report an
example of diagnostic graph for the localization example in Fig. 1.
Input and Output admissibility. Consider the case in which the camera captures a very
dark image caused by a sudden change of brightness in the scene. Upon receiving camera
images, the Visual Odometry module can detect the underexposed image as unintended and
report a failure from testing the camera module. If we look at the example in Fig. 1, we
can capture this test as an edge between modules 10 → 5 . In perception systems, this
type of consistency function is very common. Following the same reasoning we can add a
consistency checks between any module and its predecessor, for example, if the point cloud
provided by the LIDAR ( 3 ) to LIDAR Registration ( 8 ) contains N coincident points we
clearly have a fault in the LIDAR module. These edges are added to the diagnosis graph
in Fig. 3. Note that using this logic we can also monitor output admissibility (the output
of a module will be the input of another).
Input Consistency. Consider the IMU integration module, suppose it receives data from
three IMUs, the module can compare the three noisy measurements and detect if one of the
three does not agree with the others; for example an IMU provides very different acceleration
measurements. Hence the IMU integration module can test the three IMU reader modules.
Output Consistency. Consider the GPS reader and the Map reader. They don’t directly
share information but suppose that a GPS measurement return a latitude and longitude
that the maps predict to be occupied by water. The map reader, using this information,
can identify the faulty measurement of the GPS, returning fail whenever testing the GPS.
In our perception example, this test correspond to an edge 2 → 1 and/or 2 → 6 .
Input/Output Consistency. Consider the case in which Visual Odometry is not able to
correctly estimate the pose of the vehicle. After fusing all the incoming pose measurements,
the Pose-Graph Optimization module 11 , can identify that visual odometry produced an
off-nominal value [35]. Input/Output consistency differs from Input consistency in that it
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needs to compute the output variable in order to test the validity of the inputs. In our
system this example corresponds to the edges 11 → 6 , 11 → 7 , . . . , 11 → 10 .
Example. Each module in Fig. 1 can use one or more of these consistency functions
described above to test other modules in the system. Each test can detect a subset of failures
that might occur, so the combination of all available tests maximize the set of detectable
faults in the system. In Fig. 3, we report an example of diagnostic graph for the localization
example in Fig. 1. By inspection and using condition (ii) in Theorem 3, we know that t ≤ 2
because 6 has in-degree equal to 2. By checking condition (iii) we discover that the graph
is in fact only 1-diagnosable. In particular, for t = 2, p = 1 and X = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 10}
(|X|= 11− 4 + 1 = 8) we have that Γ(X) = {11} therefore |Γ(X)|≤ p. This means we can
uniquely identify faulty modules only in the case where just one such fault occurs.
3.2.2 Temporal Diagnostic Graphs
In the previous section, we considered instantaneous fault diagnosis. In other words, at any
iteration, given a diagnostic graph and a syndrome we can detect and identify faulty pro-
cessors only considering tests occurring at that time instant. However, perception modules
evolve over time and considering the temporal dimension allows adding temporal checks
and modeling systems with modules operating at multiple frequencies. In the following, we
extend the notion of diagnostic graphs to account for the temporal dimension of perception.
In a perception pipeline, different modules publish information at different frequencies. For
example consider the system in Fig. 1. Within each second, the IMU publishes 100 times,
whereas the GPS reader only publishes once. We can thus take the subgraph D′ ⊆ D on
nodes according to minimum publishing frequencies and with edges that have both end-
points in D′. For instance, consider the nodes that publish at least at 100 Hz, those nodes
are 4 , 9 , and 11 . The resulting subgraph of D that we would obtain taking these nodes
in depicted in Fig. 4a. Note that we might have different subgraphs for each publishing
frequency as in Fig. 4. Clearly we can perform fault detection over each of these “instan-
taneous” diagnostic graphs. However, as mentioned above, considering the evolution of the
system over time provides further opportunities for fault detection.
(a) 100Hz (b) 20Hz (c) 5Hz (d) 1Hz
Figure 4: Subgraphs of the diagnostic graph in Fig. 3, one for each publishing frequency.
If we consider an arbitrary interval [a, b] of time (taken in seconds), over the interval we
have the opportunity to collect multiple diagnostic graphs with their syndromes (Fig. 5).
Furthermore, the output of the modules of these graphs cannot be arbitrary, and must
have some temporal consistency. For instance, because motion is continuous, measurements
of the AV pose at consecutive times should be close to one another. Another example is
that, since the AV has a limited braking power (imposed by physical constraints), a set
of consecutive IMU acceleration measurements cannot exceed some bounds. Therefore the
diagnostic graphs at different moments in time can be connected via temporal consistency
9
Figure 5: Example of temporal diagnostic graph over a small time interval (0.02 s).
function, i.e., we can make tests (or edges) that go across time. We call the collection
of the diagnostic graphs in the time interval [a, b] and the corresponding temporal edges
a [a, b]-temporal diagnostic graph (Fig. 5). The simplest form of temporal consistency
involves an edge connecting two identical nodes occurring at consecutive time steps, e.g.,
two consecutive IMU measurements. However it can easily be extended to different modules
and neighboring (but not adjacent) time steps.
Besides being more expressive, this approach has the potential to greatly increase the t-
diagnosability of the system. Intuitively, the temporal diagnostic graph becomes larger, but
also more diagnosable, when longer intervals of time are considered.
Corollary 4. If D ⊆ D′ are two graphs with the same set of vertices, then t(D) ≤ t(D′).
Proof. Assume conditions (i), (ii), and (iii) hold for 〈D, t〉. Since D and D′ have the same
number of processors, condition (i) holds for 〈D′, t〉. Since δin(D) ≤ δin(D′) and for every
X ⊆ U we have ΓD(X) ≤ ΓD′(X), conditions (ii) and (iii) hold also for 〈D′, t〉.
We can prove that the t-diagnosability is monotonic under temporal restriction.
Proposition 5. Let D = (U,E) be a diagnostic graph. Suppose given subsets Ui ⊆ U that
cover U, in the sense that U = ∪i∈IUi, and for each i ∈ I, let Di ⊆ D be the largest subgraph
with vertices Ui. Then if each Di is t-diagnosable, so is D.
Proof. Assume each Di is t-diagnosable, and suppose that σ is a syndrome for a t-consistent
fault set on D (so it has at most t-many faulty nodes). Then its restriction to each Di has
fewer than t-many faulty nodes, so the faulty nodes in Di can be accurately diagnosed. Since
every node is in some Di, every node can be accurately diagnosed, so D is t-diagnosable.
Example. Let us consider a small interval of time, say [a, a+ 0.02]. In such an interval of
time we should get three different diagnostic graphs for the 100 Hz rate (see Fig. 4a). Each
of those graph is 1-diagnosable. Now suppose we can test consistency across one and two
consecutive instants, obtaining the temporal diagnostic graph in Fig. 5. The diagnosability
of the temporal diagnostic graph in Fig. 5 is now 3-diagnosable (cf. Theorem 3). From this
example, one can see the advantages of including the temporal dimension for fault diagnosis.
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4 Temporal Type Theory
This section shows that temporal diagnostic graphs can be elegantly described with the
language of topos theory. In particular, in order to organize the information of multiple
graphs that interact over time-intervals of varying length, as well as the diagnosability and
collection of faulty nodes in these graphs, we use the mathematical language of temporal
type theory as described in [36]. In the following, Section 4.1 briefly reviews basic concepts
of topos theory, while Section 4.2 tailors these concepts to temporal diagnostic graphs.
4.1 Sheaves, Behavior Types, and Toposes
In temporal type theory, one models various types of behavior using data structures called
sheaves. A sheaf B assigns a set B(a, b) to each open interval (a, b) ⊆ R, understood as the
set of possible behaviors that can occur over the time-window (a, b). For any subinterval
(a′, b′) ⊆ (a, b), the sheaf also assigns a restriction map −|[a′,b′]:B(a, b) → B(a′, b′), which
crops the behavior β ∈ B(a, b) to the subwindow, returning some β|[a′,b′] ∈ B(a′, b′).
Every aspect of the vehicle motion and the perception system considered in this paper has
a representation in this common language of behavior types. For example, at any moment
of time, every variable v ∈ V of type Type(v) has an associated a behavior type
Varv(a, b) := {x: (a, b)→ Type(v), continuous}
where the restriction map −|[a′,b′]: Varv(a, b) → Varv(a′, b′) is given by composition. That
is, given x ∈ Varv(a, b), define x|[a′,b′] to be the composite (a′, b′) ⊆ (a, b) x−→ Type(v).
Below we will discuss behavior types for diagnosing faults in the perception pipeline as
data arrives over intervals of time. To do so, we first construct the behavior type Grph of
all temporal diagnostic graphs. A (a, b)-behavior, i.e., element of Grph(a, b), consists of a
graph G = (U,E) together with a function U → (a, b), meaning that each node is assigned a
moment in that interval, indicating the moment at which it occurs. For any (a′, b′) ∈ (a, b),
the restriction map sends G to G|[a′,b′], the maximal subgraph on the nodes that exist within
the subinterval (a′, b′); in other words it includes all the edges from G between those nodes.
All possible behavior types, as sheaves, form a topos B. A topos is a well-studied algebraic
system that has many useful formal properties [27], [28]. For example behavior types A,B
can be added (a behavior of A + B is a behavior of A or a behavior of B), multiplied
(a behavior of A × B consists of a pair (a, b) of behaviors), exponentiated, etc. Moreover
every topos comes equipped with its own internal language, which includes a full-fledged
constructive logic. In the internal language of B, the booleans are replaced with a notion
of temporal truth values, a behavior type Prop of all propositions. It comes equipped with
all the constants, operations, and quantifiers, true, false,∧,∨,⇒,¬,∀,∃. The internal
language can be used to provide very short and intuitive descriptions of complex objects. One
writes the description set-theoreatically, and then the topos machinery turns that description
into one that varies in time. For example, if one writes the standard definition of vector
space in the internal language, the result will be a vector space changing in time.
Example. We can use the internal language to define the sheaf of upper-bounded naturals,
denoted N. In the internal language it is defined by N := {u : N → Prop | ∀n : N, u(n) ⇒
u(n + 1)}, meaning “if n is an upper bound, then so is n + 1”. This translates to saying
that a behavior u ∈ N(a, b) assigns a natural number to each open subinterval of (a, b), and
smaller subintervals can be assigned smaller natural numbers.
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4.2 Temporal Diagnostic Graphs as Behavior Types
Temporal diagnostic graphs such as the one in Fig. 5 have a special property: any clipping
to a subinterval has a lower diagnosability number. To be more precise, let D = (U,E) be
a graph and for any a ≤ b ∈ N, let D[a,b] = (U[a,b], E[a,b]) denote the graph with vertices
U[a,b] = {(τ, i) ∈ N× U | a ≤ τ ≤ b} and edges
E[a,b] = { ((τ, i), (τ, j)) | (i, j) ∈ E} ∪ {((τ, i), (τ + 1, i)) | i ∈ U, a ≤ τ ≤ b− 1}
Thus, the graph U[a,b] consists of b − a + 1 copies of D, as well as edges connecting corre-
sponding nodes across neighboring copies. For example D[a,a] ∼= D, whereas we can imagine
D[a,a+1] as two panes, each a copy of D, and an edge from each node in the first pane to
the corresponding node in the second pane.
Now for any frequency f and graph D = (U,E), consider a temporal graph D with D(a, b) =
D[da/fe,bb/fc],
2 where each vertex (i, u) is sent to the time da/fe + f · i. It consists of
multiple panes, spaced f -apart, each isomorphic to D. We call temporal graphs constructed
as D was above time-regular graphs and denote the subsheaf of time-regular graphs by
GrphtReg ⊆ Grph.
It follows from Proposition 5 that if one clips a time-regular graph D(a, b) to a smaller
interval (a′, b′), the result will have a smaller diagnosability number. Thus we obtain a map
of sheaves t: GrphtReg → N, sending each time-regular graph D to its diagnosability number
t(D). Note that this contains a large amount of information: D is not just one graph but
a graph D(a, b) for every duration of time, and similarly t(D) consists of a natural number
t(D)(a, b) ∈ N for every interval (a, b).
Using the language of temporal type theory we can also model fault detection over arbitrary
intervals. Suppose actual data is coursing through the perception pipeline. For every interval
(a, b) of time, we have a diagnosability graph D(a, b), and every node in it has published
values for each of its variables. This induces a function Fault_free:U → Prop, that
sends every module i ∈ U to the union of all subintervals throughout which it is fault-
free. The perception system is trying to infer this function, but on short intervals does not
have enough data to determine it. Thus it returns Not_known_faulty:U → Prop with
Fault_free⇒ Not_known_faulty. For short intervals, when the t-diagnosability number
is low, this will often be a strict inclusion: some faulty nodes may fail to be diagnosed.
However by auditing longer intervals, the decision layer can often ex post facto diagnose the
faulty nodes and obtain an equality.
5 Conclusion
We presented a novel methodology for fault diagnosis in perception systems. Towards this
goal, we drew connections with the literature on diagnosability for multiprocessors systems
and generalized it to account for heterogeneous modules interacting over time, as the ones
arising in perception systems. In particular, we showed that considering the temporal di-
mension, i.e., assessing the consistency of the system behavior over time, has the potential
to enhance diagnosability, while still enabling the use of existing tools for fault detection.
Finally, we showed that the proposed monitoring approach can be elegantly described with
2Note that the graph in Fig. 5 has strictly more edges than D[0,2], so we can still conclude the result
from Corollary 4.
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the language of topos theory which allows the formulation of diagnosability and fault detec-
tion over arbitrary time intervals. While the approach is fairly general and applicable to a
variety of perception systems, we considered a localization system as a case study.
We believe that the proposed notion of temporal diagnostic graphs can complement the
literature and enhance the current practice, contributing to the goal of achieving safety and
trustworthiness in autonomous vehicle applications. For instance, a system designer can use
the tools proposed in this paper to assess the diagnosability before deploying the vehicle on
public roads, or design the system in such a way that its fault diagnosability is maximized.
While deployed, the proposed framework allows the vehicle to have a greater awareness of its
operational envelope and enables real-time perception monitoring via runtime diagnosability.
Finally, for regulators, system-level guarantees provide a more solid and rigorous ground for
certification, and, in the unfortunate case of an accident, the proposed approach increases
accountability by providing formal evidence about the root cause of the failures.
This work opens a number of avenues for future work. First, we plan to provide more exam-
ples of perception systems that can be modeled with (and can benefit from) the proposed
monitoring approach. Second, we plan to build on the results presented in this paper to
model an entire AV software architecture using the language of temporal type theory.
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